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〈Editorial〉
Populism in Japan: Fascist, 
neoliberal, and leftist variants (2)
Ulv Hanssen
5. The emergence of neoliberal populism after the end of the 55 system
(Continued from the previous issue) 
The LDP’s loss to a shaky eight-party coalition in 1993 marked the end of the 55 
system. The end of this system also loosely coincided with two other momentous 
collapses: the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union which brought an end to the Cold War. The first collapse marked the beginning 
of a long period of slow growth that continues to this day. The second collapse had 
a disastrous impact on left-wing parties around the world, as their policies were 
discredited and the neoliberal policies of the Cold War winners gained momentum. 
Japan was no exception to this trend. The once-mighty Socialist Party suffered a string 
of disastrous election losses in the 1990s and was relegated to insignificance. The LDP 
quickly regained its political hegemony, but it now had to contend with new forces 
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inside the party that were heavily influenced by the zeitgeist of neoliberalism, and 
which pushed the party in the direction of market liberalization and small government. 
Such policies, they claimed, had helped the USA win the Cold War, and could also 
save the ailing Japanese economy. It was these forces that would spur the emergence 
of populism in Japan. Unlike the ethnocentric populism in Europe and the left-wing 
variants in Latin America, the populism that emerged in Japan around the turn of the 
millennium was strictly of the neoliberal t
1)
ype. Japanese populism thus demonstrates 
Mudde’s point that populism is itself no more than a ‘thin-centered’ ideology and needs 
to be combined with other, thicker ideologies, such as neoliberalism, to find a concrete 
expression.  
The first and most famous example of this kind of neoliberal populism in Japan 
was the politics propagated by the highly popular Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō 
(2001-2006). Koizumi railed against the bureaucrats who, he felt, were steering 
Japanese policymaking despite being unelected, as well as politicians within the 
LDP, his own party, who were beholden to special interests, such as the farmers. In 
the 2001 LDP presidential election, he famously vowed to ‘destroy’ [bukkowasu] 
the old LDP. His neoliberal program consisted of reducing the size and role of 
the government, eliminating wasteful spending, ending subsidies to unproductive 
industries, increasing competition, and privatizing budget-draining public corporations. 
The old LDP, he argued, had created all these problems, so his political target was 
just as much the old guard of his own party as it was the opposition parties. Two of 
his most important political goals were the privatization of the public corporations in 
charge of construction and maintenance of Japan’s highways, and the privatization of 
Japan’s postal services. The first goal ended in failure as Koizumi eventually had to 
compromise with the powerful ‘highway tribe’ [dōro-zoku] inside the LDP, but on the 
second goal, Koizumi refused to budge and went to previously unimaginable lengths 
1 Nakakita, Kōji (2020) ‘Chiiki kara no popyurizumu’ [Populism from the districts], in Mizushima, 
Jirō (ed.) Popyurizumu to iu chōsen: Kiro ni tatsu gendai demokurashī [The populist challenge: 
Modern democracy at a crossroads], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, p. 285-313; Yoshida, ‘Populism 
“made in Japan,”’ p. 288-299.
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to get his way. Just like the highways, the postal services had many powerful defenders 
inside the LDP, so Koizumi’s privatization project met resistance at every step of the 
way. In 2005 Koizumi sent his privatization bill to the Diet where it narrowly passed 
the Lower House, with 37 LDP members voting against it, but was defeated in the 
Upper House. An outraged Koizumi expelled those who had voted against the bill from 
the party and called a snap election in which he fielded so-called ‘assassins’ [shikaku] 
– young and popular candidates – to go after the dissenters in their districts. Koizumi 
made it clear that the election would be centered solely on the issue of postal reform, 
and thus would function as a popular referendum on the issue: ‘I want to clearly ask all 
the people (through the election) whether (they are) for or against postal p
2)
rivatization.’ 
Koizumi vowed to step down if the LDP and its coalition partner Kōmeitō failed to 
win a majority, thus showcasing his resolve. Many LDP members were appalled by 
Koizumi’s theatrical and vengeful tactics of deploying ‘assassins’ against dissenters. 
The strategy was a great success, however, as Koizumi’s unconventional grit and 
determination appealed to a public that had gotten increasingly tired of bland politicians 
who only talked but never acted. The LDP won 296 of 480 seats, its biggest electoral 
win ever. Koizumi naturally took this as a mandate to carry out his postal reform, and 
the privatization bill passed both houses in 2006.
From the above, it should be clear that Koizumi was an adherent of a thick-centered 
neoliberal ideology, but to what extent was this combined with the thin-centered 
ideology of populism?
Ōtake Hideo has characterized Koizumi as a populist because of his ‘binary and 
theatrical style of p
3)
olitics.’ If we consider Koizumi’s tendency to draw a sharp divide 
between the ‘reform forces’ and the ‘resistance forces,’ and his dramatic decision to 
2 Kajimoto, Tetsushi (2005) ‘Koizumi calls election for Sept. 11: Seeks voter mandate to resurrect 
postal reform,’ The Japan Times, August 9, retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2005/08/09/national/koizumi-calls-election-for-sept-11/#.X0oV64uRVPY.
3 Ōtake, Hideo (2006) Koizumi Junichirō Popyurizumu no Kenkyū: Sono Senrayku to Shuhō 
[A study of Koizumi Junichirō populism: Its strategies and methods]. Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai 
Shinpōsha, p. 4.
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call a snap election over postal reform, we can certainly say that Koizumi’s political 
style was both binary and theatrical. However, if we follow the conceptualization of 
populism outlined in this article, style is not sufficient to make someone a populist. 
Slightly reformulating the populist characteristics mentioned in the beginning, this 
paper understands a populist as someone who draws up a sharp division between a 
morally superior people and a morally inferior elite, and passionately sides with the 
former in a struggle to reclaim democratic powers that have been unjustly monopolized 
by the latter. In Koizumi’s case, there can be no doubt about his antagonistic attitude 
towards the elites. For Koizumi the elites were the old guard in the LDP who nurtured 
close relations with a myriad of particular constituents, as well as the unelected 
bureaucrats who exercised undue influence over policymaking and often ended up 
in jobs in the very industries they had regulated as public servants. His invocation of 
a pure and morally superior people, on the other hand, is far less obvious. Koizumi 
did certainly frame his neoliberal agenda as an attempt to restore the people’s trust 
in politics by offering a more transparent type of politics. In his inauguration speech, 
he stated that ‘everyone who is involved in politics or administration must solemnly 
accept the criticism of the people, and by sincerely carrying out our duties, we must 
rebuild a relationship of t
4)
rust.’ Moreover, his decision to essentially turn the 2005 
snap election into a referendum on postal reform was in line with populists’ preference 
for direct rather than indirect democracy, as the former offers the people unmediated 
participation in the decision-making p
5)
rocess. Nonetheless, it is hard to find any 
consistent message in Koizumi’s rhetoric that seeks to frame him as a unique defender 
of the people. Of course, Koizumi makes frequent references to the people, but he 
does not seem to claim any unique ability to represent them that exceeds that of other 
politicians. Moreover, he openly admitted that his structural reforms would hurt the 
people in the short-term and asked them to ‘endure the p
6)
ain.’ This departs from typical 
4 Koizumi, Junichirō (2001) Statement made on May 7, Diet session 151, Lower House, Plenary 
Session 27, statement 3, retrieved from the Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku Shisutemu [Diet debate 
search system], https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115105254X02720010507&current=1.
5 Taggart, Populism, pp. 103-105.
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populist messaging in which immediate salvation for the people is often a key promise. 
In summary, one could say that Koizumi scores high on antagonism against the elites, 
but lower on taking the side of the people. The latter characteristic does not disqualify 
him from the populist label, however. In line with Laclau, we should conceptualize 
populism as a matter of degree, so Koizumi was less of a populist than the definitional 
ideal type, but still considerably more so than standard, consensus-oriented LDP prime 
ministers of the past. In other words, Koizumi’s populism was of the weak variety. 
5.1. The second wave of neoliberal populism
The next wave of neoliberal populism took place in the 2010s, with the emergence of 
Osaka Governor and later Mayor Hashimoto Tōru and Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko. 
What is particular about this populist wave is that it mainly played out in local rather 
than national politics. Hashimoto, a celebrity lawyer, became the governor of Osaka 
in 2008, and established the local party Ōsaka Ishin no Kai (OIK, Osaka Restoration 
Association) in 2010 with the primary policy of changing Osaka’s prefectural status 
from an urban prefecture [fu] to a metropolis [to]. The goal of this policy was to elevate 
Osaka to the same status as Tokyo, Japan’s only officially designated metropolis, and 
thus increase the former’s competitiveness. Hashimoto’s OIK was strongly motivated 
by neoliberalist market principles, and Hashimoto explicitly pointed out Koizumi as 
an ideological source of i
7)
nspiration. Much like Koizumi, Hashimoto lashed out against 
ineffective bureaucrats and beholden politicians (especially in the LDP), as well as 
‘local councils, labor unions, and school councils,’ which he saw as inhibiting the 
effectiveness of governance, business, and e
8)
ducation. In 2012, Hashimoto (this time 
as Osaka mayor), together with former Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, formed 
Nippon Ishin no Kai (NIK, Japan Restoration Association) to compete at the national 
level. The party has enjoyed some electoral success nationally, but generally struggles 
6 Ōtake, Koizumi Junichirō Popyurizumu, p. 4.
7 Nakakita, ‘Chiiki kara no popyurizumu,’ p. 289.
8 Yoshida, ‘Populism “made in Japan,”’ p. 290.
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to garner support outside of O
9)
saka. NIK has also been riven with internal divisions and 
undergone a series of mergers and splits with other parties. Today NIK has 11 (of 465) 
seats in the Lower House and 16 (of 245) seats in the Upper House. After Hashimoto’s 
big plan of giving Osaka metropolis status narrowly failed to pass a 2015 referendum, 
he stepped down from politics.
Soon after Hashimoto retired, a new neoliberal populist movement formed in Tokyo, 
centered on the city’s governor, Koike Yuriko. In January 2017, Koike founded Tomin 
Fāsuto no Kai (TF, Tokyoites First), a local Tokyo-based party espousing a type of 
neoliberal policies that were similar to those of Hashimoto, but perhaps somewhat 
milder (for example, Koike does not attack labor unions). Koike, who was one of 
Koizumi’s hand-picked ‘assassins’ in the 2005 snap election, entered politics in 1992 
and worked her way up the ranks of the LDP, serving in several ministerial positions, 
and was open about her aspirations to become Japan’s first female prime minister. In 
2016 Koike successfully ran for Tokyo governor, against the wishes of the LDP which 
threw its weight behind another candidate (she was reelected in 2020). In 2017 Koike 
left the LDP and established the aforementioned Tokyoites First. In the May 2017 local 
election, the TF and TF-endorsed candidates secured an overwhelming majority of the 
seats, ending the LDP’s dominance in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly. As Tokyo 
governor, Koike has halved the governor’s salary and pledged to increase the office’s 
level of t
10)
ransparency, thus differentiating herself from the previous Tokyo governors 
who often were criticized as lacking in this regard. She was especially critical of the 
opaque process that led to former Governor Ishihara’s decision to move Tokyo’s famed 
Tsukiji fish market to a new and reportedly polluted location. Koike accused Ishihara of 
jeopardizing the health of Tokyo citizens and even set up an investigative committee in 
which Ishihara was interrogated. Koike is officially only a special advisor to the TF, but 
the party is far more centered on her persona than was the case with Hashimoto and his 
OIK/N
11)
IK. Her image appears on the party’s posters and she is heavily involved in the 
9 Nakai, ‘“Hashimoto gekijō.”’
10 Yoshida, ‘Populism “made in Japan,”’ p. 290.
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shaping of its policy agenda and organization. Its platform reflects Koike’s ideological 
orientation, focusing on spending cuts and transparent politics. Similar to Hashimoto, 
Koike also tried to impact national politics by establishing the national party Kibō no 
Tō (KNT, The Party of Hope) in 2017. KNT brought onboard a number of members 
from the opposition Democratic Party, but ultimately failed to make a splash in the 
October 2017 general election. Koike subsequently resigned as party leader. 
Both Hashimoto and Koike displayed populist traits, but in both cases it must be 
said that their anti-elite antagonism is far clearer than their celebration of the morality 
of the people. Nakai Ayumu has written about the populism of both Hashimoto and 
Koike, and a similar impression emerges upon reading his analyses. The antagonism 
is certainly present. Hashimoto railed against an ineffective bureaucracy, corrupt 
establishment politicians, and unfair media. In the words of Nakai, ‘after assuming 
the post of Osaka prefectural governor in 2008, Hashimoto Tōru began using populist, 
political methods, whereby he would designate the various special interests that 
opposed “reform” as “enemies” and sought to delegitimize them by assuming a 
confrontational s
12)
tance.’ A similar pattern can be seen in the case of Koike. As Tokyo 
governor, Koike sharply criticized the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office and 
labelled its decision-making process as a ‘black box’ which she promised to pry 
open with transparent politics. Her attacks against former governor Ishihara over his 
shadowy decision to move the Tsukiji fish market were particularly tough, even going 
as far as to summon him to hearings. In the 2017 Tokyo metropolitan election, Koike 
lashed out against the pork-barreling LDP veterans, or the ‘assembly mafia bosses’ 
[togikai no don], as she labeled t
13)
hem. Hashimoto and Koike’s confrontational stance 
against the old guard, does indeed reflect the anti-elite antagonism that is characteristic 
of populism, but, as with Koizumi, the elevation of the people as morally superior 
11 Nakakita, ‘Chiiki kara no popyurizumu,’ p. 295.
12 Nakai, ‘“Hashimoto gekijō,”’ p. 354.
13 Nakai, Ayumu (2020) ‘Popyurisuto chiji to iten no seiji: Tōkyō, Tsukiji Shijō no iten no jirei’ 
[A populist governor and the politics of transfer: The case of the transfer of the Tsukiji market in 
Tokyo], Sandai Hōgaku 53(3/4), pp. 159-160.
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is not a strong feature of their politics. Although Nakai highlights ‘references to the 
people’ as a primary characteristic of p
14)
opulism, there are only a few examples of such 
references in his analyses of Hashimoto and Koike. He points out that Hashimoto was 
the first Japanese politician to use social media effectively, and this enabled him to 
communicate directly with the people in a way that no other politician had done b
15)
efore. 
Moreover, Hashimoto’s success in turning elections into de facto referendums for or 
against the singular issue of metropolis status, is in line with the populist proclivity 
for direct democracy. In the case of Koike, the most obvious reference to the people is 
the name or the local party she created, Tokyoites First. Its resemblance to former US 
President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ slogan is arguably a big reason why Koike 
has been given the populist label by the media. However, a more substantive populist 
trait is her prioritization of ‘the gut feeling of the people (Tokyoites)’ and the ‘“common 
sense” of ordinary people’ over expert a
16)
dvice. This was most apparent in her decision 
to delay the transfer of the fish market from Tsukiji to the reportedly polluted site in 
Toyosu, despite the conclusion of an expert panel that the site was safe. However, her 
trust in the people’s ‘common sense’ only went so far, as she eventually allowed to 
transfer to take place. Apart from these token acclamations of the moral superiority of 
the people, there is little in Nakai’s analyses that suggests that Hashimoto and Koike’s 
reverence of the people was particularly deep-rooted. Arima Shinsaku has argued that 
Koike gained broad support from Tokyoites by ‘fighting against the LDP members in 
the local council, while positioning herself and the TF on the side of the ordinary Tokyo 
r
17)
esidents.’ However, he offers few examples of how this side-taking was reflected in 
her language and actions, and concedes that, ‘while there is a populist aspect [to Koike] 
in which she stands on the side of the people and skillfully exploits ordinary people’s 
14 Nakai, ‘Popyurisuto chiji,’ p. 161.
15 Nakai, ‘“Hashimoto gekijō,”’ p. 359-361.
16 Nakai, ‘Popyurisuto chiji,’ p. 181.
17 Arima, Shinsaku (2017) ‘Gekijō-gata popyurizumu no shiten kara Koike tochiji o yomitoku’ 
[Analyzing Governor Koike from a perspective of theatrical populism], Seikatsu Keizai Seisaku, 
June, p. 20. 
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“frustration and anger” towards established politics and local politics,’ what ultimately 
won her popular support was her ‘theatrical style of p
18)
olitics.’ This seems like a 
reasonable observation. As for Hashimoto, it could be said that his obsession with ‘self-
responsibility’ [jiko sekinin] sometimes made him sound more elitist than populist. In 
a tense debate with high school students concerned about his plans to cut education 
subsidies, Hashimoto scolded the students in a decidedly non-populist manner, telling 
them that if they wanted change, they should ‘become politicians’ because ‘in today’s 
world self-responsibility is the principle. No one’s going to save y
19)
ou.’ 
This means that the key cases that have been labeled Japanese populism by Japanese 
academics – from the right-wing terrorists in the 1930s, through Koizumi in the 2000s, 
to Hashimoto and Koike in the 2010s – have lacked a real notion that the people 
should be the source of political power. This does not necessarily disqualify Koizumi, 
Hashimoto and Koike as populists, as populism should be seen as a matter of degree, 
but their populism should be considered as rather weak. Its weakness notwithstanding, 
populism represents a break with the traditional, consensus-oriented politics of postwar 
Japan and, as such, requires explanation.               
5.2. Why did (neoliberal) populism emerge in the 2000s?
Japan has avoided the more extreme forms of right-wing populism that have plagued 
Europe and the USA in recent years, but the emergence of (weak) neoliberal populism 
in Japan is still an unusual phenomenon that requires explanation. Why did populism 
emerge on the political stage in Japan in the 2000s after being absent throughout the 
entire Cold War, and why was it neoliberal? One general explanation for the emergence 
of populism can be found in the end of the Cold War structure. The Cold War provided 
an ideological framework with capitalist and communist blocs in which it was easy 
to know who were friends and enemies. In this structure, the communist bloc was the 
18 Arima, ‘Gekijō-gata popyurizumu,’ p. 20. 
19 Fumin (2016) ‘Hashimoto chiji, yōsha nai tōron, joshikōsei o nakaseta’ [Governor Hashimoto 
in merciless debate, makes high school girl cry], YouTube. April 28, retrieved from https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=_NS3IxrA8Co. 
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undisputed enemy in most democracies around the world. This framing was accepted 
by a majority of the population in democratic states, so the establishment parties were 
generally seen as defending the nation from this enemy. When the Cold War ended, 
however, it was no longer clear who the enemy was, and this ideological uncertainty 
opened up a space for populists to reformulate new enemies internal to the s
20)
tate. It 
was no longer enough for establishment parties to champion anti-communism to 
secure support. Domestic issues, such as inequality and immigration, took on renewed 
importance. Kunisue Norito has argued that, by identifying new enemies, populists 
offer to ‘bring back the order of blocs that was lost with the end of the Cold W
21)
ar.’ In 
other words, by pointing to lazy immigrants and corrupt politicians, populists can offer 
ontological security and a sense of superiority to people who, to their shock, discovered 




While this explanation perhaps tells us something about the emergence of 
populism around the world, it says little about the particular circumstances in Japan, 
and even less about why Japan’s populism was neoliberal. In order to understand 
the rise of Japan’s neoliberal form of populism, it is necessary to look closer at the 
particular developments in Japan. We may recall that Mizushima Jirō pointed out that 
Japan’s high membership rate in intermediary organizations, such as neighborhood 
associations, labor unions, and interest groups, tied most Japanese, formally or 
informally, to the mainstream parties under the 55 system. In the post-Cold War period 
membership in these organizations has dropped dramatically. While only 17 percent 
of adults did not participate in any such organization in 1989, the percentage of non-
members had increased to over 44 by 2
23)
018. This means that the mainstream parties 
20  Mudde, ‘The populist zeitgeist,’ p. 555.
21 Kunisue, Popyurizumu-ka suru sekai, p. 43.
22 Yoshida, Tōru (2018) ‘Popyurizumu seiritsu no rekishiteki jōken: Kisei erīto wa inobēshon wo 
okoseru ka’ [The historical conditions for the formation of populism: Will the established elites 
be able to bring about innovation?], Chūōkōron, December, pp. 46-47.
23 Mizushima, ‘Chūkan dantai no suitai,’ p. 33.
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have become increasingly unable to rely on their affiliated organizations to mobilize 
support. Populists, Mizushima claims, are now able to solicit support from a growing 
pool of unaffiliated [musoshiki-sō] voters who have no particular loyalties to the 
mainstream parties. This possibility is particularly evident in the big cities, where 
organizational membership is lower than in the districts. 
Mizushima also points to the diminishing importance of Japan’s traditional media 
as a factor that creates possibilities for populists. As the Japanese population becomes 
less dependent on newspapers, TV and radio for news coverage and instead turn to the 
internet for information, it becomes possible for populists to use the internet to bypass 
traditional editorial processes that tend to give precedence to the established p
24)
arties. 
This is certainly not a Japan-specific phenomenon, but given Japan’s extraordinarily 
high newspaper readership, the media in Japan has arguably created a bigger hurdle 
for political outsiders than elsewhere in the world. In 2008 as much as 90 percent of 
the adult population reported that they read morning newspapers, but a decade later 
this number had fallen to 68 percent and newspaper readership was surpassed for the 
first time by online news readership (71 p
25)
ercent). Mizushima writes further that the 
increased dissemination of populist messaging on the internet has created spillover 
effects, whereby mainstream media is increasingly compelled to report on populist 
parties and politicians due to the general interest they have sparked through their 
internet outreach.
The diminishing role of intermediary organizations and mainstream media are 
unquestionably important factors behind the rise of Japanese populism, but given 
the widely reported connection between populism and economic c
26)
rises, it is also 
worthwhile to investigate this relation in a Japanese context. The bursting of the 
economic bubble in the early 1990s marked the definite end of the Japanese economic 
24 Mizushima, ‘Chūkan dantai no suitai,’ p. 37-51.
25 The Japan Times (2018) ‘More Japanese read news online than in newspapers for first time, 
survey finds,’ January 20, retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/20/national/
media-national/japanese-read-news-online-newspapers-first-time-survey-finds/.
26 E.g. Kriesi, ‘Populism.’
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miracle which had seen annual double-digit growth rates in the 1960s, and lower, but 
still impressive, growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s. Ironically, it could be argued that 
some of the policies that had kept populism at bay under the 55 system – privileged 
treatment of the rural districts and vulnerable industries – carried within them the 
seeds of populism, particularly the neoliberal variant. As the economy slowed, there 
was naturally a need for an explanation of what had gone wrong. Neoliberals pointed 
to lack of transparency, wasteful budgets, subsidies to unproductive industries, 
government control, and regulations on the corporate sector as the culprits. The old 
LDP-led ‘developmental state’ with its administrative guidance and economic plans 
became an easy target. Neoliberals had an easy solution to Japan’s economic woes: 
let the market work its magic without government interference. The neoliberal logic 
enjoyed unprecedented appeal after the Cold War since it was widely seen as the 
ideology that had defeated communism, and if it could flaunt such an impressive 
achievement, it surely could fix the Japanese economy too. This was at least the point 
people like Koizumi tried to sell: 
‘Generally speaking, there is socialism and liberal economies. There is the idea that the 
government should intervene and the state should do everything, and there is the idea 
that government will not be allowed to intervene. [...] Look at East and West Germany, 
look at North and South Korea, look at the former Soviet Union and the USA. [...] It 
is clear for everyone to see that the countries that insist on government and taxes, and 
insist that bureaucrats must be involved, these countries have lowered people’s living 
standards far more than the liberal economies. That is why I’m making the point that 
new prospects will emerge if we let the private sector do what it can on its o
27)
wn.’
Japanese people were, moreover, beginning to lose patience with the seemingly nev-
27 Koizumi, Junichirō (2002) Statement made on January 24, Diet session 154, Lower House, 
Budget Committee 3, statement 78, retrieved from Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku Shisutemu [Diet 
debate search system], https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115405261X00320020124&curre
nt=3.
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er-ending string of corruption scandals in the political world. While many Japanese 
were willing to look through their fingers at corruption scandals during the years of 
high growth, such scandals became increasingly hard to swallow when the economy 
ground to a halt. A huge influence-peddling scandal in 1988 (the Recruit scandal) 
involving not only politicians, but also bureaucrats, seemed to be the last straw and 
greatly damaged public trust in the LDP-led order, while it simultaneously increased 
the appeal of neoliberal calls for transparency. Koizumi’s highly popular promise to 
‘destroy’ his own party and end the era of clientelist politics took place in this context. 
Neoliberal diagnoses of Japan’s economic problems were just a short step away from 
populist criticisms of the particular elites that had created these problems. The ‘illiberal’ 
p
28)
olicies Japan had followed under the leadership of the LDP made the LDP elites vul-
nerable to attacks from a neoliberal angle once the economy stagnated and people were 
looking for someone to blame. The ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s thus made neoliberalism 
a natural companion of populism in Japan.
Finally, Toru Yoshida has offered a convincing institutional explanation for why 
much of Japan’s neoliberal populism has taken place at the local executive (governors 
and mayors) level in the big cities rather than at the national level. Yoshida attributes 
the existence of neoliberal populism at the local executive level to what is called the 
dual representation system [nigen daihyō-sei] under which local assembly members and 
executives are elected in separate elections. While local assembly members are elected 
in a multitude of smaller administrative districts, governors and mayors are elected in 
prefecture-wide or city-wide elections. This is different from the national level where 
the executive (prime minister) is elected by the Diet members. The dual representation 
system means that local assembly members and executives often try to appeal to 
different constituencies. Yoshida argues that local assembly candidates tend to demand 
more spending in order to channel it to localized interests through pork-barrel methods. 
On the other hand, ‘[c]andidates for executive office must appeal to geographically 
dispersed constituencies, and especially to voters in urban areas, who tend to be 
28 Lind, ‘Nationalist in a liberal order.’
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relatively highly educated and working in the service i
29)
ndustry.’ These urban voters 
are generally disadvantaged by pork-barrel politics that redistribute wealth from the 
cities to the countryside, and tend to be critical of such practices. ‘Therefore,’ Yoshida 
continues, ‘a rational strategy for executive candidates is to criticize the local assembly 
and its councilors, blaming them for prioritizing the particular interests of a specific 
sector or industry that they r
30)
epresent.’ This creates tensions between the executive 
and the local assembly members and, thus, opens up a space for neoliberal populism 
at the local executive level, particularly in big cities, such as Tokyo and O
31)
saka. While 
this may explain the emergence of populist executives, such as Hashimoto in Osaka 
and Koike in Tokyo, it also highlights the fact that there are still significant hurdles for 
populists outside of the big cities. Mizushima argues that it is unlikely that we will see 
populist success in the rural areas because the LDP still dominates the countryside and 
rural voters still benefit more from LDP policies than those of other parties: 
‘Compared to other countries, local resentment towards the government is relatively 
limited in Japan. Even if there is some movement towards anti-establishment parties 
among the unaffiliated voters in the three major cities (Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya), it 
would be very difficult for this [trend] to spread n
32)
ationwide.’
In summary, there are various reasons for the emergence of neoliberal populism in 
Japan after the end of the Cold War. On a general level, populists around the world 
benefitted from the end of the stable Cold War structure, as the loss of the communist 
enemy facilitated the designation of new enemies internal to the state. In Japan’s case, 
populism was also boosted by the weakening of intermediary organizations that had 
29 Yoshida, ‘Populism “made in Japan,”’ p. 295.
30 Yoshida, ‘Populism “made in Japan,”’ p. 295.
31 See also Nakai, ‘Popyurisuto chiji,’ p. 164-165.
32 Tahara, Sōichirō and Jirō Mizushima (2019) ‘Popyurizumu kara yomitoku minshushugi no 
genzai’ [Understanding the present state of democracy by analyzing populism], Ushio, April, p. 
115.
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affiliated voters to the establishment parties. This trend made it possible for populists 
to realistically compete for a growing pool of unaffiliated voters without specific party 
loyalties. Furthermore, the weakening of Japan’s mainstream media and growing popu-
larity of alternative online platforms for information dissemination allowed populists to 
bypass an institutional hurdle that previously had ignored their messages. 
On the more specific question of why Japan’s populism emerged in a neoliberal 
form, it is possible to point to the problems Japan was facing after the end of the Cold 
War. Unlike many other democracies, Japan’s problems were not related to high levels 
of job outsourcing or immigration, but rather to economic stagnation. This made the 
pork-barrel politics that partly had created this economy a natural target for populists. 
The neoliberal populist appeal was further strengthened by the notorious presence of 
corruption in Japanese politics, as well as the momentum neoliberalism enjoyed around 
the world as an ideology that had defeated communism. Finally, neoliberal populism 
seems to be particularly well suited for governors and mayors of big cities, given that 
their constituents disprove of traditional pork-barrel politics that favor the countryside. 
Adopting neoliberal populism allows big city executives to distinguish themselves 
from the beholden establishment politicians on the national and local levels. 
6. Whither Japanese populism? Reiwa Shinsengumi and a new left-wing populism
Yoshida argues that ‘Japan has experienced only neoliberal p
33)
opulism,’ but in 
2019 Japan was introduced to a new type of populism with the establishment of the 
small party Reiwa Shinsengumi (RSG). RSG’s entry into the Upper House in 2019 
arguably marked ‘the first appearance of left-wing populism in J
34)
apan.’ RSG is led by 
the charismatic ex-actor Yamamoto Tarō, who entered politics in 2013 singularly on 
an anti-nuclear power platform. While the opposition to nuclear power is still a key 
element of his agenda, RSG has a much more diverse policy platform that resembles 
33 Yoshida, ‘Populism “made in Japan,”’ p. 290.
34 Nakakita, ‘Chiiki kara no popyurizumu,’ p. 285.
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that of left-wing populists in Europe and the USA. RSG’s top policy priorities are 
decreasing and ultimately abolishing the consumption tax, making the corporate 
tax more progressive, increasing the minimum hourly wage to 1500 yen through 
government subsidies, canceling student debt, and increasing social welfare in 
general. Despite his own popularity, Yamamoto chose to put two severely handicapped 
candidates on the top of the party’s list in the 2019 Upper House election. Both 
candidates were successful, but the party did not get enough votes to secure a seat for 
Yamamoto himself. The prioritization of two handicapped candidates did, however, 
earn the small party far more media publicity than would otherwise have been the case, 
and this trend only continued after the election as the Diet had to be reconstructed 
to accommodate the special needs of RSG’s wheelchair-bound parliamentarians. 
Yamamoto is thus currently without a Diet seat. He challenged Koike Yuriko in the 
2020 Tokyo gubernatorial election, but finished in a distant third place.  
     As its policy priorities indicate, RSG is clearly on the left wing of the ideological 
spectrum, but can Yamamoto and his party be described as populists? Yamamoto 
himself has accepted this label, saying ‘if saving people is populism, then, yes, I am 
a p
35)
opulist.’ Axel Klein has investigated whether RSG can be characterized as ‘left 
populism’ and concludes that RSG is not a left-wing populist party because, as he 
claims, ‘there is neither a Manichean antagonism nor any anti-pluralist or illiberal 
element in RSG’s t
36)
exts.’ To use anti-pluralism and illiberalism as criteria for left-
wing populism is problematic since such qualities are typically the staples of right-
wing, rather than left-wing, populism. In fact, advocates of left-wing populism often 
differentiate themselves from right-wing populists by calling for pluralism and liberal 
v
37)
alues. Under Klein’s criteria one would be hard pressed to find an example of a left-
35 Nakamura, Kasane (2019) ‘Reiwa, Yamamoto Tarō daihyō “watashi wa popyurisuto desu.” 
Hatori Shinichi mōningu shō de “saha popyurizumu” to no shiteki ni sengen’ [Reiwa party leader 
Yamamoto Tarō [says] ‘I am a populist.’ Declared [in response to] suggestions of ‘left-wing 
populism’ on Hatori Shinichi’s morning show], Huffington Post Japan. August 1, retrieved from 
https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/entry/story_jp_5d4241f9e4b0aca34118407d.
36 Klein, ‘Is there left populism in Japan?’, p. 13.
37 Mouffe, For a Left Populism. 
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wing populist anywhere in the world, indeed it would be questionable whether left-wing 
populism could exist at all. Klein’s point about the lack of a Manichean antagonism is 
debatable as well. Klein argues that RSG lacks ‘the enemy image of a “corrupt elite” or 
“corrupt e
38)
stablishment,”’ but this image is actually a recurring element in Yamamoto’s 
rhetoric. For example, Yamamoto argues that raising the consumption tax was a 
scheme by establishment politicians to ‘cover the deficits after reducing the [corporation 
and income] taxes on their most valued clients – the corporations and the r
39)
ich.’ He 
similarly states that the ‘power-holders’ have allowed a predatory student loan system 
as a ‘kickback to their friends’ in the ‘financial institutions’ who abuse education as a 
‘business t
40)
ool.’ He might not use the word ‘enemy,’ but there is no question about his 
antagonism toward the colluding and corrupt elites. 
The other side of the populist coin – siding with the people – is also far more 
explicit in RSG’s rhetoric than is the case with the neoliberal populists. Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser have argued that populists usually invoke ‘the people’ through a 
combination of three different understandings of the term: 1) ‘the people as sovereign’ 
(the people is seen as the only legitimate source of power), 2) ‘the common people’ 
(the people is equated with a particular socioeconomic class), and 3) ‘the people as 
the nation’ (the people is equated with a particular e
41)
thnicity). Yamamoto’s use of ‘the 
people’ combines the first and second meanings of this triad, but the socioeconomic 
focus is particularly strong. He paints Japan as a ‘hellish’ society that has been 
‘destroyed’ by 20 years of neoliberal austerity politics, and claims to fight for the 
ordinary people who have been victimized in this p
42)
rocess. He mainly focuses on the 
plight of the weakest members of the society, such as poor fishermen, debt-ridden 
38 Klein, ‘Is there left populism in Japan?’, p. 13.
39 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon (2020) Ele-King special issue, Tokyo: Ele-King Books, p. 
21.
40 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, p. 28.
41 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism, pp. 9-11.
42 E.g. Yamamoto, Tarō (2020) #Anata o Shiawase ni Shitainda: Yamamoto Tarō to Reiwa 
Shinsengumi [#I want to make you happy: Yamamoto Tarō and Reiwa Shinsengumi], Tokyo: 
Shūeisha, pp. 54-57.
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students, part-time workers, small business owners outside of Tokyo, families living 
in poverty, the homeless, etc. He complains that ‘what is lacking in today’s politics is 
compassion for the people living in this c
43)
ountry.’ This heartless reality is contrasted to 
the ideal society he is striving to build, namely a society which ‘abandons no o
44)
ne’ and 
which ‘extends a helping hand when you need it the m
45)
ost,’ reflecting his preference for 
a generous state. Yamamoto laments that the age-old division between ‘lords’ [okami] 
and ‘commoners’ [shomin] is still very strong in people’s minds, so many Japanese are 
reluctant to criticize the elites even when the elites are to blame for the deterioration of 
their lives. He therefore implores the people to ditch this mentality and realize that the 
‘commoners’ are, in fact, ‘the most powerful people in this c
46)
ountry.’ This is in line with 
the first populist meaning of the people outlined by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser: ‘The 
people as sovereign.’ The people must be the ultimate source of power. Yamamoto also 
invokes their second meaning of the people: ‘The common people.’ He clearly identifies 
with Japan’s ‘commoners’ and focuses on the socioeconomically disadvantaged layers 
of the population. This is also evident in his clothing and speaking style. He rarely 
campaigns in a suit, and when he does, he often wears sneakers. Moreover, compared 
to traditional politicians, his rhetoric also makes far less use of Chinese loanwords, 
which are typically considered more elitist than common Japanese words. His choice 
to place two severely handicapped people on the party list before himself can also 
be seen as an attempt to show that he is willing to sacrifice himself for ordinary and 
disadvantaged people. There is no particular invocation of the nationalist third meaning 
of the people (the people as the nation). He is generally opposed to immigration, but he 
expresses his anti-immigration arguments purely in economic language (immigration 
will push wages down and hurt both Japanese and i
47)
mmigrants). Both antagonism 
toward a corrupt elite and identity with a pure people are, thus, recurring features of 
43 Yamamoto, #Anata o Shiawase ni Shitainda, p. 24.
44 Yamamoto, #Anata o Shiawase ni Shitainda, p. 61.
45 Yamamoto, #Anata o Shiawase ni Shitainda, p. 65.
46 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, p. 27.
47 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, pp. 31-33.
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Yamamoto and RSG’s rhetoric. But how should we characterize their ideology?   
According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, populism is itself only a thin-centered 
ideology, and, as such, requires a thicker host-ideology to amount to a political project. 
Klein argues that ‘RSG does not draw on any host-ideology’ and that ‘the idea of 
ideology is conspicuously absent from its r
48)
hetoric.’ This is partly correct. Yamamoto 
vehemently tries to avoid ideology labels, arguing that such labels only lead to 
ideological opposition, which complicates his mission to ‘improve people’s lives and 
to bring the economy back on t
49)
rack.’ In a recent interview, he stated that ‘I have not 
even once considered myself to be on the left. I don’t label myself. What is important 
is to help people who are struggling, so ultimately such things [labels] don’t matter. 
I’m tired of ordering things into right and l
50)
eft.’ This certainly gives the impression 
that RSG is not bound to a host-ideology. But even if there is no mention of socialism, 
Marxism or progressivism, it is not actually the case that RSG’s rhetoric is devoid 
of ‘anti-system i
51)
deas.’ In fact, if there is one ideological position that drives RSG’s 
populism, it is anti-neoliberalism. RSG’s populism can be seen as a direct repudiation 
of the neoliberal populism of Koizumi, Hashimoto and Koike. When Yamamoto paints 
Japan as a ‘hellish’ society, he does not refer to the entire postwar period, but rather the 
neoliberal period of the past 20 or 30 y
52)
ears. He explicitly attacks neoliberalism as an 
ideology, stating that ‘due to the influence of neoliberalism everyone has become p
53)
oor.’ 
He especially criticizes the neoliberal idea of ‘self-responsibility’: 
‘The word “self-responsibility” began to appear as austerity policies were mounting up. 
I believe it began around the time of the Koizumi period. [...] There is this idea that if 
you live poorly and you can barely get by, this is because you didn’t work hard enough, 
48 Klein, ‘Is there left populism in Japan?’, p. 18.
49 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, p. 34.
50 Yamamoto, #Anata o Shiawase ni Shitainda, p. 64.
51 Klein, ‘Is there left populism in Japan?’, p. 18.
52 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, p. 33.
53 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, p. 23.
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or because you’ve been incompetent. [...] For the ruling powers, this is like a magical 
word, it’s a very powerful word. The “self-responsibility argument” ensures that people 
involved in politics and the ruling powers are never held a
54)
ccountable.’
Ideology is ultimately a conviction about where the battle lines should be drawn in a 
society, about who is friend and who is foe. While RSG’s ideology might not contain 
sophisticated theories about the workings of society, it does contain clear battle lines. 
The common people, particularly society’s weakest members, are pitted against the 
neoliberal elites who have turned Japan into an unfair and heartless society. In this 
struggle, RSG presents itself as a staunch defender of the people. In sum, RSG can be 
described as an anti-neoliberal populist party – a new political phenomenon in Japan. 
In fact, its populist traits are far stronger than those of its neoliberal counterparts, as 
both the anti-elite antagonism and the identity with the people are unmistakably pres-
ent. 
Neoliberal populism can be highly antagonistic, but it will perhaps always struggle 
to claim strong bonds to the people since its prioritization of market principles often 
hurt many of those the neoliberals claim to represent. There is inherently something 
elitist about neoliberal populism that is at odds with the populist idea of people’s 
sovereignty as its policies unfailingly lead to a concentration of economic and political 
power in the hands of a few wealthy elites at the expense of the broad m
55)
asses. In that 
sense, RSG, whose ideology is based on opposition to neoliberalism and support for its 
victims, can be categorized as Japan’s first case of strong populism.
 
7. Conclusion
Using a framework that conceptualizes populism as a thin-centered ideology, this arti-
54 Yamamoto Tarō Kara Mieru Nihon, pp. 23-24.
55 Hopkin, Jonathan (2020) Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich 
Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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cle has analyzed three cases of Japanese populism: fascist populism in the 1930s, neo-
liberal populism in the 2000s and 2010s, and leftist populism in the present. It found 
that the first two cases, despite their strong anti-elitist character, must be considered as 
relatively weak variants of populism due to their lacking or limited invocations of the 
will of the people as the basis of governance. The fascists wanted political power to 
reside with the Emperor rather than the people, while the neoliberals generally did not 
claim to represent the people’s will in a way that significantly distinguished them from 
mainstream politicians in the democratic system. The article argued, however, that the 
emergence of Yamamoto Tarō and his Reiwa Shinsengumi in 2019 constitutes the first 
case of strong populism in Japan. This is because, in addition to taking an antagonistic 
stance toward the elites and their neoliberal project, the party also clearly sees the com-
mon people as the only legitimate source of political power and portrays itself as the 
true representative of these neglected people.    
The emergence of strong populism in Japan does not, however, mean that the country 
is on the doorstep of a new age of populist politics. RSG only has two representatives 
in the Diet, and Yamamoto failed to make a splash in the 2020 Tokyo gubernatorial 
election. Moreover, the LDP’s grip on power looks likely to continue even after the 
long reign of Abe Shinzō. This indicates that the Japanese electorate is still quite 
content with elite rule and hesitates to take a chance on populist alternatives. However, 
as inequality is on the rise and immigration is set to increase as a countermeasure to 
Japan’s demographic problems, it appears reasonable to assume that the potential for 
both left and right populism will grow in the years to come.
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